HB

THE HOLLOW BORDER

Criminal Governance · State Abandonment · Geopolitics of Migration · Colombia–Venezuela
CRITICAL ZONE POST-MADURO TRANSITION
Carreño Santamaría · Cubillos · Kantor  |  Kantor Consulting, June 2026
▸ Interactive Border Map — 2,219 km
La Guajira
Catatumbo
Táchira–Cúcuta
Arauca–Apure
CARIBBEAN SEA CARIBBEAN SEA L. Maracaibo COLOMBIA VENEZUELA LA GUAJIRA CATATUMBO TÁCHIRA–CÚCUTA ARAUCA–APURE Bogotá Cúcuta S. Cristóbal Maicao Valledupar El Tarra Arauca Pto. Carreño Maracaibo Barinas Caracas Pto. Ayacucho ▸ JAN 2026 DEPLOYMENT 30,000+ uniformados 11,000 · Catatumbo ▸ DRONE ATTACKS 313 explosive incidents Apr 2024–Aug 2025 · 215 cas. ↑ Click any highlighted zone for detailed analysis
◈

Select a Border Zone

Click any highlighted region on the map to view detailed analysis, key actors, and incident data.

Border Zones
La Guajira Wayuu · Bachaqueo
Catatumbo Coca · ELN · Drones
Táchira–Cúcuta Trochas · Urban
Arauca–Apure Hybrid Governance

La Guajira

Norte (COL) · Zulia/Guajira (VEN) · THREAT LEVEL
The northernmost zone. Historical Wayuu indigenous sovereignty predates both Colombian and Venezuelan states. Structurally defined by the bachaqueo (fuel contraband) economy and the Gulf of Venezuela maritime dispute. Colombian Army intelligence classifies it as a Level II threat zone.
Key Figures
4.1M
Liters contraband gasoline/day across full border
52×
Gasoline price increase Zulia→Bogotá (2011)
1–2.7M
Liters/day (Táchira–Norte de Santander corridor)
II
Colombian Army threat classification
Armed Actors
ELN

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Controls informal corridors; exploits and manipulates indigenous communities to maintain monopoly over bachaqueo logistics

LOC

Los Pachencas Clan

Organized crime network active in fuel smuggling corridors; competes with ELN for corridor monopoly

WYU

Wayuu Indigenous Communities

Maintain customary legal order; view bachaqueo as legitimate subsistence, not criminal activity. Historically both victimized by and entangled with armed networks

Illicit Economies
Fuel Bachaqueo Contraband Goods Drug Transit Irregular Migration
Strategic Context
ONGOING
Gulf of Venezuela maritime delimitation dispute: potential offshore petroleum reserves add a strategic dimension to bilateral postures beyond current violence levels
JAN 2026
Colombia activates PMU command post in Maicao following Maduro capture; 30,000+ troops deployed along full border
2019
Colombian Army Operational Order "GIRARDOT 1.0" identifies La Guajira as active operational zone; combined exercises with U.S. forces simulate response scenarios in this terrain

Catatumbo

Norte de Santander (COL) · Zulia (VEN) · CRITICAL
Primary focal point of armed conflict intensity. Colombia's principal coca-producing zone. The ELN offensive of January 16, 2025 expelled FARC dissident factions and consolidated ELN hegemony. Home to the Filo Gringo drone warfare school — a formalized training architecture for AI-enabled drone swarms.
Key Figures
117+
Dead in Jan–May 2025 ELN offensive (HRW)
65K+
Persons forcibly displaced Jan–May 2025
11,000
Colombian troops concentrated in Catatumbo post-Jan 2026
2025
Year Filo Gringo drone school became operational
Armed Actors
ELN

ELN — now hegemonic

Expelled 33rd Front of FARC dissidents Jan 2025. Controls coca corridor toward Venezuela. Relocated labs to Venezuelan municipality of Jesús María Semprún to evade Colombian eradication

33F

FARC 33rd Front (EMC) — expelled

Expelled from Catatumbo by ELN offensive Jan 2025. Former controller of cocaine corridor

FANB

Venezuelan FANB (enabling actor)

Venezuelan territory used as logistical rear base and armed mobility platform for ELN operations. Laboratory relocation enabled by FANB tolerance or complicity

⚡ Filo Gringo Drone School
LOCATION
Corregimiento of Filo Gringo, near El Tarra municipality, Norte de Santander — operated under alias Norbey
CAPABILITY
AI-enabled drone swarms capable of launching mortar grenades in simultaneous coordinated attacks. Structured curricula with specialized instructors — not improvised individual experimentation
PARADOX
Colombian military pressure compresses ELN ground operations while simultaneously accelerating development of aerial capability in the same theater (Infobae, 2026)
Illicit Economies
Coca Production Cocaine Labs Gramaje Tax Drug Trafficking (→VEN→Caribbean/EU) Extortion

Táchira–Cúcuta

Norte de Santander (COL) · Táchira (VEN) · URBAN CORRIDOR
Most densely populated and historically integrated border zone. The 2015 border closure displaced flows to trochas (informal trails), which became entrenched as criminal governance infrastructure. Features 200+ active trochas and colectivo-controlled power corridors. Contested between ELN and Tren de Aragua at key crossing point La Parada.
Key Figures
200+
Active trochas (informal crossing trails)
+49%
Colombian export growth post-border reopening 2023–24
2022
Border formally reopened under Petro (Sept)
2015
Venezuela closed border; created trocha economy
Armed Actors
COL

Bolivarian Colectivos

Frente Bolivariano Motorizado (Táchira) — documented by HRW in connection with extrajudicial executions. Controls crossings on Venezuelan side. Operates as extralegal repression force allowing state violence without accountability

ELN

ELN

Competes with Tren de Aragua for control of La Parada crossing point. Exercises "popular justice" and social regulation in border communities

TdA

Tren de Aragua

Disputes ELN for control of La Parada (CNN Latinoamérica, 2023). Transnational expansion from Venezuelan prison origins. Operates extortion networks and migrant trafficking along crossing points

Trocha System
FUNCTION
Trochas are not marginal routes — they are criminal governance infrastructure. Control enables imposition of tolls varying by migrant profile or merchandise type, systematic rent extraction, and de facto customs authority
PARADOX
"Politics of generosity" (Palma-Gutiérrez, 2021): state humanitarian rhetoric stops exactly where criminal exploitation begins — leaving migrants in structural vulnerability where security depends on non-state actors
2009
Venezuelan army accused of dynamiting two border bridges in Norte de Santander, disrupting local community communication — interpreted by Colombia as deliberate act of hostility
Illicit Economies
Trocha Tolls Human Trafficking Migrant Extortion Contraband Drug Transit

Arauca–Apure

Arauca (COL) · Apure/Táchira (VEN) · HYBRID GOVERNANCE
Most advanced case of Hybrid Criminal State. The ELN has transitioned from traditional insurgency to pro-regime paramilitary force. Houses La Abuela — a clandestine drone training school in Venezuelan territory operated by FARC dissidents. Colombian-Venezuelan operational boundary has been functionally dissolved.
Key Figures
JOINT
ELN+FANB operations against FARC dissidents documented
EFER
ELN financial structure controlling narco vertical integration
GNB
Venezuelan National Guard jointly coordinates with ELN (HRW 2025)
DAET
Venezuela's most lethal force — coordinates with ELN per HRW
Armed Actors
ELN

ELN — de facto sovereign

Acts as "first line of Bolivarian defense" (Larratt-Smith & Aponte González, 2022). Uses Venezuelan territory as rear base, sanctuary, and now formalized training infrastructure. Provides dispute resolution, justice, road maintenance in exchange for absolute obedience

10F

FARC 10th Front / Segunda Marquetalia

Principal adversary of ELN in Arauca-Apure corridor. Joint ELN-FANB operations documented against these factions (InSight Crime, 2026)

FBM

Federación Regional de Motorizados (Apure)

Colectivo identified by HRW in connection with extrajudicial executions of civilians accused of collaborating with rival groups; physical torture documented

⚡ La Abuela Drone School
LOCATION
Venezuelan states of Táchira and Apure, within FARC dissident control — inside the hybrid governance architecture described in this chapter
CURRICULUM
Reconnaissance drone systems, communications, and basic electronic countermeasures — including techniques for evading common jamming frequencies (Infobae, 2026)
IMPLICATION
Venezuelan territory functions as rear base, sanctuary, and formalized training infrastructure. La Abuela is not an anomaly — it is a logical institutional extension of hybrid governance architecture
Illicit Economies
Drug Trafficking (EFER) Illegal Mining Extortion Cocaine Corridor (→Caribbean/Europe) Mobility Rent Extraction

The hollow border designates a border space that retains juridical and international recognition, but whose institutional content has been eroded from both sides. This is not a failed state (Venezuela maintains government, armed forces, currency) nor a conventional open-conflict zone. It is a border where formal institutions subsist as nominal structures, while criminal actors exercise effective governmental functions over territory, population, and economy.

1
State Collapse

The collapse of the Venezuelan state as a modern political project — not total collapse, but the systematic substitution of formal governance with criminal networks that reproduce power through illicit revenues, military loyalty, and territorial control.

2
Criminal Economy Reconfiguration

Binational criminal economies — cocaine, fuel, illegal mining, human mobility — have been restructured around the border as their primary operational axis. The ELN's EFER architecture represents the vertical integration of narco-trafficking from production through transportation and laundering.

3
Asymmetric Securitization

Mass migration has been asymmetrically securitized — treated simultaneously as a humanitarian issue and a security threat, depending on political context. Colombia's 2021 Temporary Protection Statute exemplifies "normalization of exceptionality": humanitarian openness coexisting with expanded tracking mechanisms.

2,219 km — the formal border. Four structurally distinct zones. Any border policy that fails to recognize this heterogeneity is doomed to be ineffective.

◈
Criminal Sovereignty vs. State Authority

The ELN and its Venezuelan allies have configured a form of functional criminal sovereignty — sustained by territorial control, the violent regulation of mobility, and the appropriation of illicit economies. In practice, this often outperforms formal state bureaucracies in providing order, dispute resolution, and even basic infrastructure maintenance.

◉
The Borderland Battle Framework

Following Idler (2019): the border is a complex ecology of governance, not a power vacuum. Non-state armed groups exercise functions of order, conflict resolution, and protection in exchange for obedience, information, and practical legitimacy. Strategies based exclusively on military pressure are insufficient without civilian institutional expansion.

Venezuela under Maduro constituted a hybrid criminal state — a "revolutionary petrostate under stress" (Mijares, 2022) that substituted democratic legitimacy with illicit revenue distribution among loyal military and political elites. With the collapse of oil revenues, border commands became spaces of extraction and enrichment. The capture of Maduro on January 3, 2026 did not resolve this structure — it removed the principal articulator of criminal equilibria without offering a replacement architecture.

☆
Cartel de los Soles

Not a traditional hierarchical cartel, but a system of generalized corruption within the Venezuelan state and military apparatus. A new U.S. DOJ indictment downgraded the characterization — shifting from "structured criminal organization" to a "clientelism system" (Dale Leal, 2026). Formal indictment against Maduro linked it to "irregular warfare" strategy.

⬡
Bolivarian Colectivos & NBM

Paramilitary groups allowing government to exercise violence without formal accountability. Post-Maduro capture: ACLED (2026) documents colectivos establishing checkpoints in Caracas under state of emergency decreed by interim president Delcy Rodríguez, preventing opposition celebrations.

⬛
Digital Authoritarianism

ZTE-developed Carnet de la Patria (biometric ID) centralizes biometric, medical, electoral, and political loyalty data via CANTV. Links social benefits (CLAP food, Patria cash transfers) to verifiable political loyalty. "Digital troops" and VenApp extend surveillance beyond territorial borders into diaspora.

2000s

Colectivos Armed & Politicized

Chávez regime arms neighborhood groups, creating extralegal repression force

2015

Border Closure / Trocha Explosion

Venezuelan closure of Táchira border; informal crossing economy institutionalized

2020

Mohajer-6 UAV Deployment

Iranian-supplied medium-altitude reconnaissance/strike platform deployed for strategic installation protection

Jan 2025

Catatumbo Seizure

ELN forcibly expels FARC 33rd Front; consolidates cocaine corridor toward Venezuela and Caribbean/Europe

Sept 2025

Russia-Venezuela Bilateral Pact

Security, defense, and technology agreement formalizing Orlan-10 UAV integration into Venezuelan military ops

Jan 3, 2026

Operation Absolute Resolve

U.S. special forces capture Maduro in Caracas; Delcy Rodríguez assumes interim presidency. Power vacuum deepens, not resolves, the structural crisis. FANB begins internal fragmentation

The transformation of non-state actors into aerial warfare practitioners is the defining tactical development of the 2018–2026 period. Between April 2024 and August 2025, 313 explosive drone attacks were documented against Colombian security forces, involving ~713 grenades and producing 215 casualties. The state's institutional response has consistently lagged behind the threat's maturation.

2018–22Phase 1: Experimentation

Commercial drones modified for reconnaissance and rudimentary explosive delivery. Incipient experimentation; limited tactical integration with ground elements.

2023–24Phase 2: Escalation

Attack frequency increases, geographic expansion beyond Catatumbo and Cauca theaters. 115 documented incidents in 2024 alone. Progressive integration with ground elements.

2025 →Phase 3: Maturation

Formalized training schools. AI-enabled drone swarms. Aug 21, 2025: UH-60 Black Hawk downed in Amalfi — 12 police officers killed. Most lethal drone attack vs. state forces in Western Hemisphere outside active war.

313 explosive drone attacks · ~713 grenades · 215 casualties (killed + wounded) · Apr 2024–Aug 2025 (Semana, 2025)

VEN
Venezuelan Drone Arsenal

Built through Iran-Russia cooperation, not domestic industry. Key systems: ANSU-100 (Mohajer-2 derivative, armed), Mohajer-6 (Iranian MALE platform), ANSU-200 (claimed stealth), Zamora V-1 (Shahed-136 loitering munition analog, introduced 2024). Orlan-10 (Russian, tactical recon). Documented overflights of Colombian territory including Cerro La Teta.

COL
Colombian Counter-Response

BANOT activated Oct 11, 2025 at Tolemaida — 300+ drones and counter-drone systems with AI, personnel trained via NATO cooperation. MBC 3-30.64 (Feb 2026): first joint UAS doctrine, NATO STANAG-aligned. INDUMIL developing GADCI prototype. ~$25M Dedrone Tactical contract. But: 4 structural gaps — temporal, scale, cyclical, budgetary.

🇺🇦
Ukraine as Knowledge Transfer Node

Ukrainian domestic intelligence has reported that Spanish-speaking volunteers infiltrated the International Legion specifically to train in FPV drone operation, with some reportedly linked to cartels and violent non-state actors — a pipeline moving combat-proven tactical knowledge from the most drone-intensive theater in contemporary warfare into criminal networks operating across these border zones. (Kantor and Santofimio Nevares, 2026b)

By 2025, more than 7.8 million Venezuelans had left their country — the largest displacement movement in recent South American history. Of these, 2,812,648 resided in Colombia, the largest receiving country in Latin America. Venezuela's displacement is characterized as "crisis migration" (Negretti Benito, 2021): departure driven not by opportunity-seeking but by the objective impossibility of surviving in the country of origin.

7.8M
Total Venezuelans who left country by 2025
2.81M
In Colombia alone (Univ. del Rosario, 2025)
74%
Colombians who believe Venezuelan immigration increases crime (unsupported by evidence)
$529M
Estimated economic impact of Venezuelan population in Colombia (IOM, 2024)

TPS
2021 Temporary Protection Statute

Colombia's 10-year protection permit with labor market access. International reference model. But also readable as "normalization of exceptionality" — incorporating migrants through temporary status that preserves juridical difference from nationals, while expanding identification and tracking mechanisms.

SMI
Safe Mobility Initiative (2023)

Processing centers in Colombia and Ecuador where applicants can apply for U.S., Canada, and Spain without traveling to border. Critical reading (Zapata, 2025): extends U.S. border control perimeter into interior of South America. Colombia as "proxy wall" for Washington (Larratt-Smith & Aponte González, 2022). $10B+ in U.S. assistance to Colombia since Plan Colombia.

↻
Return Projections

Only ~20% of Venezuelans abroad currently consider returning. MMC (2026): abrupt political change does not automatically generate mass or sustainable returns. Reconstruction of living conditions will take a generation, not the fall of a single figure. Decisions of the diaspora will respond to concrete assessments of security, livelihoods, legality, and realistic expectations.

Operation Absolute Resolve (January 3, 2026) removed the principal articulator of Venezuelan criminal equilibria without offering a replacement architecture. Muggah and Roberts (2026) propose five geopolitical scenarios; the Mixed Migration Centre (2026) proposes three migration scenarios that operate transversally.

A

Graduated Democratic Transition

Rodríguez interim government negotiates constituent process with opposition under international supervision. FANB cohesion preserved. ELN initiates peace talks incorporating border dimension. Requires: internal cohesion, regional backing (Colombia+Brazil), sanctions relief, prosecution guarantees for mid-level commanders.

LOW–MOD
B

Failed State & Regional Fragmentation

Power vacuum produces territorial fragmentation — different FANB factions, ELN, FARC dissidents, local criminals control distinct areas. Colombia faces multiplicity of hostile armed actors rather than a centralized state interlocutor. Migration flow intensifies dramatically.

HIGHEST RISK
C

Armed Bolivarian Resistance

ELN and FARC dissidents, with colectivos and FANB sectors, launch insurgent campaign against new Venezuelan government and U.S. presence. Colombia trapped between its U.S. relationship and practical need to maintain interlocution with border-dominating actors. ACLED considers this most probable if new Venezuelan government perceived as unconditionally U.S.-aligned.

MOST PROBABLE
D

Unity Government with Military Impunity

Pragmatic Madurismo and moderate opposition agree on shared government guaranteeing impunity for military commanders implicated in drug trafficking and crimes against humanity. ELN reduces public visibility but retains operations. Criminal governance persists under new institutional cover. Least substantive transformation of existing border order.

STABLE-BAD
E

U.S.-Controlled Reintegration

Washington assumes direct management of transition via military presence, technical assistance, conditioned economic aid. Colombia acts as regional intermediary with counterinsurgency capabilities. ELN faces coordinated trilateral military pressure. High risk of armed escalation; severe humanitarian effects on border.

HIGH ESCALATION
Migration Scenarios (Mixed Migration Centre, 2026)

Scenario 1 · Mass Return

Only plausible with rapid stabilization + economic opening + security guarantees. Even then: gradual, led by working-age adults with active family networks. Dependent on institutional reconstruction that cannot be consolidated short-term.

Scenario 2 · Partial Return

Selective returns driven by limited economic incentives (oil-sector reactivation). Concentrated among skilled workers, entrepreneurs, capital holders. Geographic bias toward Caracas and oil regions. Would deepen territorial inequality within Venezuela.

Scenario 3 · New Forced Displacement

Most destabilizing: Maduro's removal triggers new violence and power struggles. New forced displacement — both internal and cross-border — directed toward Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Chile. Greater irregular routes, maritime crossings, trafficking networks.

All sources cited in The Hollow Border (Carreño Santamaría, Cubillos, Kantor · Kantor Consulting, June 2026). Primary intelligence documents, peer-reviewed academic sources, and investigative journalism.

2026
ACLED. Venezuela post-Maduro: Armed groups and the Bolivarian revolution. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.
2026
Al Jazeera. Colombia reacts with alarm to Maduro's removal by US forces. aljazeera.com ↗
2023
Ávila Hernández et al. Contrabando, bachaqueo y economías informales en la frontera colombo-venezolana. Universidad de los Andes.
2025
BBC News Mundo. What is Cartel de los Soles, which the US is labelling as a terrorist organisation? bbc.com/news/articles/cy8j4ye5x0mo ↗
2012
Bialasiewicz, L. Off-shoring and out-sourcing the borders of Europe. Geopolitics, 17(4).
2005
Bigo, D. & Guild, E. Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe. Ashgate.
2026
Blanquicet, J. Mindefensa anuncia el despliegue de más de 30.000 uniformados en la frontera. El Tiempo. eltiempo.com ↗
2026
Center for a Secure Free Society. Strategic challenges for stabilizing Venezuela after Maduro. SFS.
2024
Chaar López, I. The cyber border: Digital surveillance and the algorithmic frontier. Border Studies, 12(2).
2023
CNN Latinoamérica. La guerra del Tren de Aragua y el ELN por el control de La Parada.
2025
Congressional Research Service. Colombia: Background and U.S. relations (R44681).
2022
Correa, J.G. & Simpson, J.M. The treadmill of destruction in the borderlands. Sociological Forum, 37(1).
2022
Coyne, C. & Goodman, N. U.S. border militarization and foreign policy. Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 27(2).
2026
Dale Leal, N. Estados Unidos elimina la referencia a Maduro como líder del Cartel de los Soles. El Espectador.
1996
Dunn, T.J. The militarization of the U.S.–Mexico border, 1978–1992. University of Texas Press.
2021
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2019
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2023
Ejército Nacional de Colombia. Plan ARSENAL: Anexo de Inteligencia Militar ORDOP MARISCAL. [Top secret primary source]
2022
Freier, L.F. & Doña-Reveco, C. Intraregional responses to Venezuelan displacement. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(12).
2026
Fuerzas Militares de Colombia. Manual Básico Conjunto MBC 3-30.64: Sistemas de Aeronaves No Tripuladas. Centro de Doctrina Conjunta.
2021
García Pinzón, V. & Mantilla, J. Ungoverned spaces, governance voids, and criminal exploitation. Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 3(1). doi.org/10.31389/jied.74 ↗
2024
Haughton, S.A. & Sewell Lewis, C. Survival migration and security. Latin American Politics and Society, 66(1). doi.org/10.1017/lap.2023.25 ↗
2025
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2024
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2019
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2026
InSight Crime. Cocaine corridor: Drugs drive ELN's Venezuela expansion. insightcrime.org ↗
2025
InSight Crime. Guerras fronterizas: el ELN y la toma del Catatumbo. insightcrime.org/es ↗
2024
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2025
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2026a
Kantor, D. & Santofimio Nevares, J. Venezuela's drone arsenal: Iranian and Russian vectors of capability transfer. Kantor Consulting.
2026b
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2020
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2023
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2022
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2022
Mijares, V.M. Venezuela as a revolutionary petrostate under stress. Palgrave Macmillan.
2026
Mixed Migration Centre. Mixed migration implications of a sudden regime rupture in Venezuela. MMC.
2026
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2021
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2025
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2025
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2026
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